Germany has emerged as Europe's most sceptical nation towards China, marking a significant realignment in how German voters and policymakers assess relations with Beijing. A comprehensive survey across thirteen European countries reveals that 49 per cent of German respondents regard China primarily as a rival or adversary—substantially higher than France's 43 per cent, which ranks second and has historically championed a more interventionist European trade agenda. This perception gap reflects deepening economic anxieties that are beginning to reshape Berlin's traditionally pragmatic approach to Chinese engagement.
The contrast between German views and those of other European nations underscores how unevenly the economic burden of Chinese competition has fallen across the continent. Only 38 per cent of German respondents characterize China as a positive force—either as partner or ally—positioning the country at the sceptical end of European sentiment. This stands in sharp relief to Spain and Bulgaria, where 65 per cent and 62 per cent respectively hold favourable views of Beijing. The disparity reflects Germany's particular vulnerability to Chinese industrial competition, especially in sectors central to its economic model.
Manufacturing employment figures paint a sobering picture of why German attitudes have shifted markedly. The European Council on Foreign Relations, a prominent research institution, documented that Germany's manufacturing sector shed approximately 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025, with current job losses continuing at roughly 10,000 monthly. This sustained employment hemorrhage has concentrated heavily in the automotive industry, historically Germany's economic engine. Chinese manufacturers have progressively displaced German producers not only in domestic markets but across global supply chains, creating an existential anxiety within boardrooms and factory floors alike.
Despite this mounting public concern, Berlin's political leadership has remained reluctant to embrace punitive trade measures. During 2024, Germany notably abstained from supporting new European Union initiatives, most visibly when other member states voted to impose anti-subsidy duties on Chinese-manufactured electric vehicles. This hesitation reflected divisions within the governing coalition itself, with Economy Minister Katherina Reiche—a member of Chancellor Friedrich Merz's Christian Democratic Union—emerging as the cabinet's most reluctant voice on implementing defensive trade actions. The government's internal divisions have created a policy vacuum even as public sentiment has crystallised into firmer opposition.
Yet the survey findings suggest that political timidity may reflect bureaucratic caution rather than electoral vulnerability. Remarkably, no fewer than 60 per cent of supporters of both the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats—Germany's two major governing parties—regard China as an adversary or rival. This convergence across the political mainstream indicates that a tougher policy stance would likely command substantial voter approval. The political calculus that has long discouraged aggressive action may thus rest on outdated assumptions about public tolerance for Chinese competition.
Germany's political landscape presents a more complex picture when examining extremist and fringe parties. The far-right Alternative for Germany, which currently leads several nationwide polling indices and appears positioned to win in certain upcoming state elections, displays notably warmer attitudes towards Beijing. Approximately 45 per cent of AfD supporters characterize China as a necessary partner, with only 31 per cent viewing it as a rival and 8 per cent as an adversary. This positioning reflects the AfD's broader scepticism towards traditional European integration frameworks and its preference for pragmatic bilateral relationships. Conversely, the Left party similarly gravitates towards viewing China as a necessary strategic partner rather than competitor.
The centre-left Social Democrats have surprised observers by adopting perhaps the most assertive major-party stance on China. A combined 60 per cent of their supporters regard Beijing as either rival or adversary, departing significantly from the traditional social democratic inclination across Europe towards softer engagement with China. This recalibration suggests that economic pain and job losses have penetrated partisan divisions that previously sheltered Beijing from serious challenge within Germany's political establishment. The SPD's repositioning indicates that even traditionally internationalist German parties now recognize electoral necessity in addressing constituent anxiety over manufacturing competitiveness.
Recent moves by Germany's largest corporations signal that business sentiment is undergoing its own dramatic transformation. Volkswagen's chief executive recently urged the European Commission to impose tariffs on Chinese-made plug-in hybrid vehicles during discussions with investors, a public endorsement that represents a historic reversal of corporate lobbying strategy. Critically, this same executive had vigorously opposed identical tariff measures merely months earlier in 2024. Such corporate about-faces demonstrate that Chinese competitive advantages have become sufficiently overwhelming to render the traditional German business approach—quietly discouraging Berlin and Brussels from taking any action—strategically untenable.
Expert analysts characterize this moment as fundamentally discontinuous with recent German history. Noah Barkin, a leading observer of German-China relations at Rhodium Group, has noted that corporate executives calling publicly for trade defence measures against China represents genuinely novel territory within contemporary German business culture. This represents recognition that Chinese competitors have achieved such dominant market positions that benign neglect has transformed into competitive catastrophe. The calculus that once favoured accommodation has collapsed under the weight of sustained market-share losses.
For Southeast Asian economies, Germany's evolving stance carries significant implications. As a major player within the European Union and a crucial component of global supply chains, Germany's pivot towards more protective trade policies could ripple through regional economies dependent on European market access. Malaysian exporters, particularly those in electronics, automotive components, and manufacturing sectors, may face increased scrutiny regarding supply-chain linkages to Chinese operations or market access within Europe. Simultaneously, Germany's shift suggests that other developed economies similarly exposed to Chinese competition may soon articulate similar concerns, potentially reshaping the global trading environment.
The timing of this transformation deserves attention within broader geopolitical context. Germany's hardening stance emerges precisely as the European Union develops its strategic autonomy agenda and as American trade policy under new leadership emphasizes more protectionist approaches. Germany's movement away from its traditional role as an advocate for open-market principles suggests that economic pain has overcome ideological commitment to free trade. This repositioning will likely influence EU-wide China policy debates and potentially accelerate the bloc's incremental shift towards more defensive trade postures across multiple sectors and trading partners.
